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 The reform of the WTO Dispute Settlement System is an integral part 
of the Doha Development Agenda launched at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial 
Conference in 2001.While the World Trade Organization is marking its 20th 
anniversary, the modernization process tends to reinforce the WTO 
legitimacy and to bring developing countries into the world economy in a 
fairer and more efficient way.  On January 30th, 2015, the Special Session of 
the Dispute Settlement Body, chaired by H.E. Ronald S. Soto, issued its 
latest report providing a state-of-play of the negotiations in this area. In light 
of the above, this paper brings to light both developing country interests in 
the current talks and the remaining challenges for their better integration into 
the Dispute Settlement System.   
 




 It is widely acknowledged that the WTO’s procedure for resolving 
trade quarrels under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (hereinafter DSU) 
is vital for enforcing the rules, and therefore for ensuring that trade flows as 
smoothly, predictably and freely as possible [E.U. Petersmann, 2012]. The 
WTO Annual report issued recently points out that: “The WTO dispute 
settlement system is lauded as one of the most active and fastest adjudicative 
systems in the world. It is preferred to the many dispute settlement 
mechanisms contained in the hundreds of regional trade agreements the 
world over. It is important to invest in its future” [WTO, 2014].  The fact is 
that the dispute settlement activity has been intensifying, confirming the 
importance that members attach to the settlement of their disputes through 
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the DSU, and their reliance on these procedures as a central component of 
the functioning of the multilateral trading system. Two thirds of the 
Membership have participated in dispute settlement proceedings in one way 
or another [WTO, WT/DSB/M/350].  
 In such circumstances, any improvements to these procedures should 
not alter the progress achieved and, instead, make an important contribution 
to the functioning of the multilateral trading system as a whole. In this 
respect, the project of modernization of the DSU is not recent. In 1994, The 
Marrakesh Ministerial Conference mandated WTO member governments to 
conduct a review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding within four years 
of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement (i.e. by 1 January 1999). In 
1997, the Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter DSB) launched the review, 
and held a series of informal discussions on the basis of proposals and issues 
that members identified. Many, if not all, members clearly felt that 
improvements should be made to the understanding. However, the DSB 
could not reach a consensus on the results of the review. 
 At the Fourth Ministerial Conference held in 2001 in Doha (Qatar), 
the WTO members launched a new round of multilateral negotiations called 
“the Doha Development Round”, with the goals of reducing trade barriers 
and considering specific needs of developing countries more accurately. 
Amongst the 21 topics addressed in the Doha Development Agenda, the 
modernization of the DSU shall not be overlooked, even if agriculture, 
services and market access for non-agricultural products issues are 
concentrating most offensive and defensive interests of major WTO players.   
 The Doha Declaration mandates negotiations on “[…]improvements 
and clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, and “based on 
the work done thus far as well as any additional proposals by members” 
[par.30]. This Declaration also states that the result of these negotiations will 
not be part of the single undertaking, meaning that they will not be tied to the 
overall success or failure of the other negotiations mandated by the 
Declaration [par.47]. In Hong Kong, Ministers further instructed to “continue 
to work towards a rapid conclusion” of these negotiations. Originally set to 
conclude by May 2003, they continue without a deadline. Since 2013, the 
work of the Special Session of the DSB has been based on a “horizontal 
process” in which interested participants have the opportunity to explore 
possible solutions together for the following twelve issues under 
consideration:  
- Panel composition 
- Third party rights 
- Mutually agreed solutions 
- Remand referral mechanism 
- Strictly confidential information 
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- Post-retaliation 
- Transparency and amicus curiae briefs 
- Timeframes 
- Sequencing 
- Developing country interests ( including special and differential 
treatment) 
- Flexibility and member control 
 Although the Chairman of the Special Session highlights that “the 
very constructive work conducted recently provides a strong basis for a 
successful conclusion of the negotiations”, such a success remains, however, 
uncertain. Not all issues are at the same level of progress, and the amount of 
work remaining to achieve convergence still varies significantly from issue 
to issue. In some areas, the technical work has been essentially completed at 
that stage, including with the stabilization of draft legal text [TN/DS/25]. In 
other areas, this comprehensive exercise has allowed a detailed 
understanding of the proposals and the respective positions of participants, 
but convergence is still not achieved.  
 In any event, all participants agree that a number of developing 
countries members face particular constraints in accessing dispute settlement 
procedures and defending their interests effectively through recourse to such 
procedures. An in-depth analysis of the WTO members involved in disputes, 
as complainant or respondent, from 1995 to 2013 shows that only 65 of them 
were concerned, with a large majority of developed and emerging countries 
[WTO, 2014]. As a way of illustration, Egypt is the only Arab country to be 
concerned by the WTO dispute settlement system and, what is more, four 
times as a respondent, while there are 13 WTO Arab members.  Thus, one 
third of the Membership has not participated in dispute settlement 
proceedings in one way or another. When they intervene as complainant or 
respondent members, many developing countries must still overcome major 
obstacles, including high litigation costs, a lack of expertise to handle the 
complexity of international trade disputes, as well as the difficulty of 
implementing adjudicators’ recommendations and rulings. There are special 
and differential treatment provisions in the DSU, but hardly effective on the 
ground. Developing countries are seeking to give teeth to these provisions 
enabling them greater participation in a dispute settlement.  
 As negotiations are moving towards a decisive phase, but also 
because developing country interests are needed to be an integral part of any 
outcome in these negotiations, this contribution endeavors to provide an 
overall assessment of their challenges in the improvement and clarification 
of the DSU. Not all the issues of negotiation mentioned earlier are of equal 
importance for developing countries. The latters’ priorities are thus grouped 
around broad themes tracing key phases of the litigation process. While 
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Section I stresses on the access of these countries to the WTO dispute 
settlement system, the second Section provides a state of progress 
accomplished for ensuring the effective compliance with DSB’s 
recommendations and rulings, and increasing the effectiveness of sanctions 
imposed by developing countries. These arguments will be followed by a 
brief conclusion. 
 
Section i: Greater Access of Developing Countries to the Dispute 
Settlement System 
 Besides a more active participation of developing countries, there is 
an emerging consensus amongst the participants as to the nature of 
difficulties faced by developing countries to be engaged effectively in WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings.  It is agreed that levelling the playing field 
should be a key objective in this respect. For this purpose, the ongoing 
negotiations have identified two possible avenues for developing country 
interests: mitigating the costs of litigation complemented by a more efficient 
technical assistance in the dispute settlement procedure (A), and facilitating 
access of non-parties, including enhancing third party rights in the panel and 
appellate stages (B).   
 
A- Mitigating the Costs of Litigation  and Increasing Expertise  
 The ongoing negotiations have highlighted limited litigation capacity 
of most developing countries, making more efficient technical assistance 
indispensable. These countries incur both financial and technical burdens in 
the implementation of the DSU.   
 Indeed, participants have widely acknowledged that the infrequent 
use of the dispute settlement system by small developing countries and least-
developed countries is, first, the result of their lack of expertise and 
knowledge of WTO rules, and that this situation is exacerbated by the 
increasing complexity of international trade disputes. Bringing an action 
before a WTO panel is a long process that requires the preparation of legal 
and business data which cannot be provided by other members or the WTO 
Secretariat. A State member must find various sources of relevant 
information by using legal experts and economists who can provide 
consultations and econometric studies supported by substantial 
documentation. Developing countries have, however, a severe lack of experts 
in these areas. The situation of Arab countries may constitute a striking 
illustration: is it necessary to recall that, notwithstanding the provisions of 
article 17(3) of the DSU by which the Appellate Body shall be broadly 
representative of WTO members, only two Arab experts have integrated this 
entity since 1995!  
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 At the same time, it is impossible not to question the effectiveness of 
the “progressive learning strategy” and the “reference centers” which 
constitute the two vertebral columns of the trade-related technical assistance 
program for developing countries. Managed by the WTO Secretariat, and 
more particularly by the Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation 
(hereinafter ITTC), this program focuses on e-learning courses, academic 
programs and workshops organized at both national and regional level. The 
immediate objective of these activities is to enable participants to understand 
the fundamental principles of the WTO in relation to the matters dealt with. 
For specific questions in connection with the Doha Round, the goal is to give 
participants the factual and analytical information required to participate 
meaningfully in the negotiations [WTO, 2014].  
 While the training tools have been continuously improved since the 
creation of the WTO, their added value for a large number of developing 
countries remains however limited. Several delegations consider that the 
priority should be given to increased capacity building and trade-related 
technical assistance or to look into possible ways of increasing the 
attractiveness of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (hereinafter ACWL) for 
members with limited capacities, as means of addressing the capacity 
constraints identified [Ronald S. Soto, 2015]. It is also suggested that 
generally focusing on solutions that would not be tied directly to litigation of 
specific cases would help to move forward. Some proponents stress that the 
dramatic situation of most developing countries requires more than a few 
weeks of training or seminars on specific issues on WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism [Ronald S. Soto, 2015]. Rather, it requires more regular training 
and monitoring mechanisms for local officials selected on skills and stability 
criteria, as well as more intense awareness policies for businesses, 
parliamentarians and decision-makers in these countries. Given that 
negotiations regarding trade-related capacity building constitute an 
autonomous theme of talks during the Doha Round, but also because of the 
lack of consensus between proponents and other participants, the current 
proposals “could be explored further” [Ronald S. Soto, 2015].  
 Apart from the lack of expertise, the participants also stress that 
WTO dispute settlement has become too expensive for developing countries, 
adding that some of the costs needed to be shared [Ronald S. Soto, 2015]. As 
a result, a number of proposals emerged as to a direct support in the form of 
a Dispute Settlement Fund (hereinafter DSB Fund) and litigation costs. For 
this purpose, a draft legal text, under Article 28 of the DSU, has even 
clarified some important aspects of the expected functioning of both 
mechanisms. The DSB Fund would be available to developing country 
complainants and respondents, irrespective of the other disputing party’s 
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development status. A proposed “Annex X” to the DSU would address its 
detailed operation.  
 From a practical standpoint, the DSB Fund would be part of the 
regular WTO budget, with the possibility of receiving voluntary 
contributions. The proponents suggest that such a fund “[…] would 
reimburse a developing country's dispute settlement costs for no more than 2 
disputes per year, only as regards legal fees and costs, and up to a specific 
ceiling for each dispute settlement stage” [Ronald S. Soto, 2015]. The DSB 
Fund’s operation would be overseen by the Budget and Finance Committee, 
and reviewed annually by the General Council.  
 Unsurprisingly, some participants posed a number of questions about 
specific aspects of the proposal’s implementation, including on budgetary 
implications and the operation of the mechanisms. The necessity of 
segregation between WTO members is also highlighted. Not all developing 
country members, nor even all developed country members, are in the same 
situation in respect of relative expertise or resources to deal with WTO 
litigation [Ronald S. Soto, 2015].  
 Another topic of concern has been the relationship between these 
proposed mechanisms and the functions of the ACWL. While the latter’s 
contribution to providing quality independent legal advice to beneficiary 
members is largely recognized, many delegations expressed concerns with 
the proposal, either for technical reasons or because of its perceived negative 
impact on the ACWL [JOB/TNC/39]. In particular, several participants 
emphasize that the ACWL has been useful in providing assistance in dispute 
settlement and dispute avoidance, and it should not be undermined. The 
reflection should start on whether to strengthen the existing mechanism of 
the ACWL, instead of creating a parallel system. Special emphasis shall be 
placed, for instance, on making its funding more stable. Several members 
still consider that, institutionally, the ACWL is a more adequate forum. 
Unlike the WTO, the ACWL could differentiate between developing 
countries in need of dispute settlement assistance and developing countries 
with major litigation capacity. Furthermore, the DSB Fund would not 
involve any costs to beneficiaries, so these members would have no incentive 
to use the ACWL. If the proposal was accepted, donor governments would 
start making a choice between the DSB Fund and the ACWL. Ultimately, the 
question would be whether it was reasonable to contribute to the ACWL as 
well.  
 In response, the proponents of developing country interests stress that 
their proposal does not aim to weaken the ACWL but to strengthen it. With 
time, this institution would be used more frequently and its work would 
increase as a result of the DSB Fund. From a financial efficiency rationale, a 
solution to the problems of developing countries in accessing WTO dispute 
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settlement should be devised at the WTO, in the DSU. It is useful to recall 
that the ACWL is outside the WTO and, consequently, not multilateral as it 
does not involve all WTO members.  
 In respect of the reimbursement of beneficiaries, it is noteworthy that 
in a dispute involving multiple developing country parties, the latters would 
all benefit from the DSB Fund. In contrast, there is no consensus for the 
proposal allowing the refund of litigation costs also in disputes between 
developing countries. Developing countries have strongly rejected that idea, 
and the proposal tries to limit the instances in which litigation costs could be 
reimbursed [JOB/TNC/39].  
 Last but not least, several participants also express concerns about the 
calculation of litigation costs and the reimbursement terms. In particular, it is 
asked whether the “[…] DSB Fund would cover costs other than those 
related to dispute settlement, or whether the Budget and Finance Committee 
would oversee the operation of the Fund only in general or would also verify 
individual bills submitted for reimbursement”.  In this respect, this raises the 
question whether the Secretariat would have “[…] any discretion to refuse 
reimbursing a frivolous or exaggerated bill under paragraph 7 of the 
proposed Annex X, and whether any recourse would be available against 
another Member's reimbursement requests” [Ronald S. Soto, 2015].  
 On the other hand, the proponents attempt to introduce checks and 
balances. In particular, there would be a ceiling on the reimbursable amount 
at each stage, and reimbursements would be made only upon the presentation 
of bills for work already done. At the same time, the proponents recognize 
the relevance of further reflection “[…] on the idea of a challenge against 
Members' reimbursement requests” [Ronald S. Soto, 2015].  
 To conclude, the proponents of the establishment of a DSB Fund 
point out that awarding litigation costs might be “complex but not 
impossible”, recalling that there are currently at least 56 jurisdictions that 
awarded litigation costs [Ronald S. Soto, 2015].  
 
B- Third Party Rights 
 With regard to third party rights, heated debates focus on the 
Chairman’s text of July 2008 and the more recent draft legal text proposed 
by the Friends of third parties, both in the G40 and in smaller groups 
meeting. The purpose is to reduce some of the confusion that may arise from 
the coexistence of these two texts. Remaining differences are also identified 
in the consolidated text. 
 Negotiators point out that an opportunity to participate as a third 
party in various proceedings may enhance access and also contribute to 
capacity building [JOB/DS/6].  Such a purpose would be reflected by the 
improvement of third party rights in participating in consultations between 
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members and adjudicators proceedings. Some proponents go further and 
propose an extension of third party’s intervention in both compliance and 
arbitration proceedings.  
 
Phase of consultations 
 Given that under DSU’s provisions third parties are excluded from 
the phase of consultations, developing countries are unable to defend their 
interests at an early stage of the dispute. Convergence therefore emerges 
around the need to integrate third parties during the consultations. Under the 
proposed approach, “Members having expressed substantial trade interest in 
consultations would be automatically joined in such consultations, unless the 
Member to which the request is addressed notifies the applicant Member and 
the DSB within 7 days of receiving the request that it considers the claim not 
to be well-founded” [Ronald S. Soto, 2015]. In the proposed text, a member 
to which such a request is addressed should favorably consider 
representations made by applicant members with respect to the reasons for 
their request. Without prejudging the types of considerations that could form 
the basis for a “substantial trade interest” in being joined in consultations, 
such a solution would provide an appropriate balance between the interests 
of disputing parties and interested members. 
 At the same time, discussions still focus on further possible drafting 
improvements, especially the importance to clarify the sequence of events 
from the request to be joined, to its consideration by the responding member 
and the notification of the decision.  Questions have also been raised as to 
whether transparency about both acceptances and refusals may be profitable, 
otherwise the notification would be useful only in cases where the request is 
denied. As a reminder, the respondent is required, under the current practice, 
to notify acceptances, but not rejections, of requests to be joined in 
consultations, and then the Secretariat circulates a document listing members 
whose requests to join have been accepted. In light of this practice, some 
proponents enquire whether delegations would be ready to explore 
mechanisms other than notifications by the responding Member in order to 
achieve greater transparency, for instance through the circulation of a DSB 
document listing the members that have and have not been joined in the 
consultations. In any event, participants share the understanding that an 
absence of timely refusal entails the automatic participation of the requesting 
member [JOB/TNC/39].  
 
Adjudicators’ proceedings 
 Alongside with the phase of consultations, discussions also relate to 
the improvement of third party rights during the panel and appellate body 
proceedings.  
European Scientific Journal November 2015 edition vol.11, No.31 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
207 
 For this purpose, participants agree that DSU’s provisions in this 
field are formulated in general terms and are relatively inadequate to 
maintain a balance between the necessity of not overloading the work of 
parties and, at the same time, facilitating third-party participation.  
 Pursuant to article 10 DSU: “ […] Any Member having a substantial 
interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB 
(referred to in this Understanding as a “third party”) shall have an 
opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the 
panel.  These submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute 
and shall be reflected in the panel report. […]Third parties shall receive the 
submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first meeting of the panel”. 
 These rights are furthered by the Appendix 3 on Working Procedures 
in the following terms: 
 “All third parties which have notified their interest in the dispute to 
the DSB shall be invited in writing to present their views during a session of 
the first substantive meeting of the panel set aside for that purpose.  All such 
third parties may be present during the entirety of this session. […] The 
parties to the dispute and any third party invited to present its views in 
accordance with Article 10 shall make available to the panel a written 
version of their oral statements”. 
 With respect to third party rights in panel proceedings, the 
proponents have therefore proposed a reshaping of article 10 of the DSU that 
may address two main issues:  
 
Providing a time period to notify the interest in participating as third 
party   
 With respect to the timeframe for expression of third party interest, 
support is expressed for codifying the practice of the 10 days from the date 
of panel establishment to express third party interest. However, concerns are 
raised with respect to the proposed processing of notifications made beyond 
this 10-day period, the possible additional burden for parties, as well as on 
the composition of the panel, if the notification was received from a member 
who had a national serving on the panel. It is also asked on what basis the 
panel would decide whether to accept such “late” requests [Ronald S. Soto, 
2015].  
 
Granting additional third-party rights, including the possibility for third 
party to participate in each substantive meeting only upon agreement of 
the parties  
 While many participants express their support for strengthening third 
party rights at this level and codifying rights that have been granted in 
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practice, the same members also underline that such access would not be 
detrimental to involved parties [JOB/DS/6].  
Emerging consensus appears between participants around the proposal 
devoting the right to take part in the second substantive meeting, which 
would include the right to make an oral statement and the right to respond to 
the questions arising in and from the meeting. Additional rights beyond those 
identified would be subject to the agreement of the parties. This would bring 
clarity and predictability in the extent of third party rights, and would also 
bring consistency in this respect. The proposal aims at achieving a balance in 
the treatment of third parties in different cases.  
 However, some participants consider that “[...] a better balance was 
reflected in an earlier proposal that envisaged third parties being allowed to 
participate actively at the first substantive meeting but only to be present at 
the second meeting, with flexibility for the panel to grant additional rights on 
a case-by-case basis” [Ronald S. Soto, 2015]. Some concerns are also 
expressed about the encumbrance resulting from the proposed enhanced 
rights for the parties, in particular in relation to the second substantive 
meeting. It is also observed that the separate proposal on transparency would 
address the issues of attendance at substantive meetings and access to written 
submissions.  
 In sum, discussions must still continue in order to bridge “formal and 
substantive differences on these issues” [Ronald S. Soto, 2015]. 
 With respect to third party rights in appellate proceedings, paragraph 
4 of article 17 DSU provides that: “Only parties to the dispute, not third 
parties, may appeal a panel report.  Third parties which have notified the 
DSB of a substantial interest in the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 
10 may make written submissions to, and be given an opportunity to be 
heard by, the Appellate Body”.     
 In view of such a restrictive approach, large support is expressed for 
allowing flexibility to join the proceedings at the appellate stage. In this 
respect, proponents indicate readiness to consider logistical and practical 
terms and conditions to address other delegations' concerns over potential 
burdens in the implementation phase. They do not propose new text in this 
respect, but support the proposal in the Chairman’s text of July 2008.  
 It is suggested that new participation at the appellate stage implies 
that third parties may bring new legal points, submissions and arguments that 
parties will have to address. This would undermine the parties' ability to 
defend their interests and focus on the resolution of their dispute. This 
concern might be addressed by imposing limits on issues that new third 
participants may raise, or applying an additional threshold for participation 
[JOB/TNC/39]. Proponents have observed that third parties, regardless of 
their number, do not have the prerogative to define the issues examined on 
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appeal. The most that third parties can do is add new arguments, support 
existing ones or provide more perspectives on already discussed issues.  
 Given the Appellate Body’s role in providing legal interpretations of 
the covered agreements, a number of participants stress the importance of the 
opportunity for all WTO members to participate in proceedings especially at 
this stage. This proposal may be of great importance for developing countries 
facing resource constraints that were unable to participate at the panel stage.  
 Further discussions are clearly required regarding the content of a 
legal text, including the manner in which the interest to join should be 
expressed, the deadline for expression of interest, and the description of the 
rights of third participants. A suggestion was made to insert general language 
in the text to clarify that the participation of third parties should not have an 
adverse impact on the ability of parties to argue their case, while leaving it to 
the Appellate Body to organize the details of how to achieve this through its 
working procedures [JOB/TNC/39].  
 In brief, the Chairman of negotiations calls for the search of 
“common ground” on the issues discussed. 
 
Third party rights in compliance proceedings  
 With regard to third party rights in compliance proceedings, it should 
be recalled that paragraph 5 of article 21 DSU provides that “[…] Where 
there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered 
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and 
rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute 
settlement procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original 
panel. The panel shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of 
referral of the matter to it[…].” 
 The proponents explain that they do not want to change the meaning 
of this provision and that the intention is only to propose clearer language.  
They recall that under the existing DSU wording and also under the 
sequencing suggested, there is no obligation to request consultations prior to 
requesting a panel under article 21(5) DSU, but it is possible. If consultations 
are requested in the context of compliance proceedings, it would be merely 
useful to clarify that third party interest may be expressed in the same 
conditions as under original proceedings, provided that the consultations are 
open [JOB/TNC/39].  
 Based on the wording of article 21(5) DSU, all delegations agree that 
consultations are optional and therefore remain possible. Further discussions 
are, however, required to propose a reformulation of article 21(5) that 
apprehend more adequately the intention of all participants [JOB/TNC/39].  
 Consensus building will also be the priority of negotiators when 
considering the draft text of article 22, paragraphs 6 and 7 DSU relating to 
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arbitration proceedings in case of objection to the level of suspension of 
concessions proposed. It should be recalled that third party participation in 
article 22(6) proceedings is not currently addressed in the DSU and falls 
within the arbitrator's discretion. Highlighting the added value of allowing 
third parties to participate, the Friends of third parties propose to clarify 
article 22(6) proceedings [JOB/TNC/39]. It is discussed whether these 
proceedings involve issues that are primarily of a bilateral nature and 
therefore not ensuring access to other members, or whether legal or other 
issues of wider systemic interest are also at issue. There continue to be 
different standpoints in this respect. Some participants consider that these 
proceedings entail primarily factual issues relating to the calculation of the 
impact of the measures on the complaining party. Others consider that the 
application of the principles of articles 22(4) and 22(3) by the arbitrator 
necessarily involves legal aspects (including an interpretation of the meaning 
of nullification or impairment) and other issues of general interest, such as 
the choice of methodologies available for the calculation of nullification or 
impairment.  
  
Section II- Effective Compliance With Adjudicators’ Reports 
 Alongside with mitigating costs of litigation and enhancing third 
party rights in dispute settlement procedures, the Chairman’s text of July 
2008 and the draft legal text presented by proponents of developing country 
interests have identified effective compliance as area of concern to them. 
There is common view on both the relative effectiveness of various remedies 
in favoring prompt compliance and the necessity to adjust the remedies 
available in order to induce effective compliance, including facilitated 
retaliation or compensation mechanisms for developing countries. Improved 
remedies may also strengthen effective access, if they increase the chances of 
achieving a resolution of the matter for the complainants. On the ground, the 
current discussions are exploring possible venues to level the playing field in 
various ways, including taking into account the impact of the measures on 
the economy of the developing country complainant, and support from other 
members or administrative sanctions.  
 Amongst delegations, it is undisputed that overall compliance levels 
have been high. The resort to retaliations measures is rare in practice. 
However, an in-depth compliance procedure’s review reveals that the 
position of developing country members remains fragile, even if these latters 
have prevailed. This fact is recognized by several members expressing 
concern that compliance was not always easily achieved, and that some may 
face particular challenges in this respect, in part because available remedies 
are not effective enough. For some members who are not frequent users of 
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the system, compliance concerns may thus represent a major proportion of 
their experience.  
 To meet these challenges, negotiators dealing with developing 
countries interests make a distinction as to whether a developing country is 
prevailing in the DSB (B) or, instead, such a member is sanctioned under 
DSU provisions (A).  
 
A- Defeated developing country 
 In the instance where a developing country is condemned, emphasis 
is given to a reasonable period of time for implementation (RPT hereinafter). 
Contrary to the proponents’ proposals which cover RPTs determined under 
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 21.3, the Chairman's text is limited 
to RPTs determined by arbitration. The primary goal is to enjoin the 
arbitrator for taking into account the particular problems and interests of 
developing country members in determining the “shortest period of time” 
within the implementing member’s domestic legal system.  
 For memory, the arbitrator(s) is granted a period of 15 months from 
the date of adoption of the DSB report to determine the RPT pursuant to the 
current text of Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, although the RPT may be shorter 
or longer “depending upon the particular circumstances”. Through 
successive arbitral awards under this provision, it has been also established 
that the RPT should be the shortest period possible within the legal system of 
the implementing member. 
 As per paragraph 2 of article 21 DSU, “Particular attention should be 
paid to matters affecting the interests of developing country Members with 
respect to measures which have been subject to dispute settlement”.  
Pursuant to this provision, some arbitrators under Article 21.3(c) have taken 
into account the situation of the developing country member to determine the 
time within which it can implement the recommendations and rulings.  
Practically, the average length of the RPT to date has been 9 months and 5 
days when agreed by the parties pursuant to Article 21.3(b), and 11 months 
and 16 days when it has been determined pursuant to Article 21.3(c) 
arbitration.  
 While some participants agree that developing country members may 
face significant constraints in the implementation process and expressed 
support for improving the current DSU provisions, other negotiators are 
seeking a number of clarifications as to how extensive the scope of the 
provision was intended to be [Ronald S. Soto, 2015]. In particular, it is asked 
what exactly the terms “interests” and “problems” of developing country 
members are intended to cover and how they differ from each other. Several 
questions raised about the scope of these terms, including whether they 
might cover considerations relating to the interests of a domestic industry 
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affected by the rulings, or considerations not directly relating to the measures 
at issue and the implementation process, such as the general economic 
situation of the implementing member. It is suggested that some 
considerations, such as political sensitivities in the implementing member, 
may not be relevant to the determination.  
 In response, it is argued that these terms are already part of the DSU, 
adding that article 21(2) refers specifically to “matters affecting the interests 
of developing country Members with respect to measures which have been 
subject to dispute settlement” [Ronald S. Soto, 2015], thus limiting the scope 
of the provision. In this context, the proponents emphasize that they are not 
seeking to modify the existing benchmark for the establishment of an RPT, 
but to guard against interpretations that would preclude such considerations 
from being given due attention.  
 In sum, the proponents confirm that the intention is to reflect in the 
DSU text the existing practice, rather than modify it. Despite substantial 
progress, the Chairman highlights that “[…] further discussion seemed 
necessary on the nature of the problems or interests to which consideration 
is to be given and the scope of coverage of the proposed text” [Ronald S. 
Soto, 2015].  
 
B- Prevailing Developing Country 
 In parallel with RPT’s issue, intensive debates also relate as to how it 
is possible of enhancing effective compliance in favor of the complaining 
developing country member. This heading includes, to a large extent, the 
following proposals:  
 
A clarification of compliance proceedings in a post-retaliation context 
 At a conceptual level, convergence emerges on a large sequence of 
steps to deal with post-retaliation situations: once the responding member 
shall assert and substantiate its claim of compliance (without prejudice to the 
exact form or legal status of this announcement), the complainant may 
challenge the respondents' assertion of compliance. If there is no 
disagreement on the achievement of that compliance, the retaliation 
authorization will be ended. In contrast, in case of disagreement, compliance 
proceedings should take place to determine whether compliance has been 
achieved. In the cases where compliance proceedings take place, the existing 
retaliation authorization remains effective until their conclusion. Where 
compliance proceedings have taken place, if it is determined in these 
proceedings that compliance has been achieved, the authorization will be 
terminated. When it is established that compliance has not been completed, 
the level of retaliation authorized may be modified to mirror the current level 
of nullification or impairment.  
European Scientific Journal November 2015 edition vol.11, No.31 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
213 
 However, the observed consensus should not neglect that further 
discussions are useful with regard to the exact procedural stages to achieve 
this sequence [Ronald S. Soto, 2015]. Three open and unresolved issues still 
remain, namely:  
- The contents and legal status of the initial notification/statement to be made 
by the respondent to assert compliance;  
  
- The process for initiation of compliance proceedings (i.e. initiated by the 
complainant or triggered by the respondent's declaration of compliance); and  
   
- The allocation of burden of proof in these proceedings.  
 
The possibility of retaliation by a group of members on behalf of a 
prevailing developing country complainant (group retaliation) 
 In respect of retaliation on behalf of another member, the insertion of 
a new language has been suggested into article 22(6) of the DSU as 
subparagraph (b), which would follow the current language of that provision, 
to be renumbered as paragraph (a) . The proposed subparagraph (b) reads:  
 “Where a developing country Member has been authorized to 
suspend concessions or other obligations under Article 22.6 (a), and it 
considers that it is not practicable or effective to utilize that authority, the 
DSB shall, upon request by such Member, authorize other Member(s) to 
suspend concessions or other obligations on behalf of the requesting 
Member unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request. The 
authorization established in this Article shall be the same as the initial 
authorization granted under Article 22.6 (a).”  
 Participants agree the underlying rationale of such a proposal and 
recognize the difficulties that some members may face in retaliating 
effectively against larger economies. In this respect, the terms of “collective 
retaliation” have been removed because the retaliation on behalf of the 
developing country complainant would not be allowed to all members. 
Rather, the complainant would approach some other members and explain 
that it faces difficulties in using the authorized retaliation. Should certain 
members be willing to do so in its stead, the transfer of the original 
authorization would then be adjudicated by the DSB [Ronald S. Soto, 2015].  
 While there appears to be broad recognition of the difficulties faced 
by small developing country members in retaliating effectively, a number of 
questions relating to the proposed solution are needed to be addressed in 
order to move forward. As a way of illustration, the proposal’s systemic and 
practical implications would require more clarification. In light of the 
bilateral nature of existing remedies under the DSU, multilateral retaliation 
“on behalf” of others would be hard to achieve. 
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Facilitated cross-retaliation for developing countries  
 In order to facilitate an assessment of equivalence, article 22(3) of the 
DSU has codified an accurate sequence for retaliation measures, starting 
with the same sector and then moving to other sectors and then other 
agreements. The wording of that provision is, however, not feasible for 
developing countries because the process of justification is too burdensome. 
Under the current discussions, the proponents of developing countries and 
effective compliance consider that the procedure for cross-retaliation under 
Article 22(3) of the DSU is too cumbersome and developing countries 
should not have to demonstrate that retaliation in a sector or under a covered 
agreement is not practicable or effective. Such a proposal is primarily 
intended to address certain evidentiary issues: it would maintain the need for 
the complainant to provide an explanation of why it was not practicable or 
effective to retaliate in the same sector or agreement, but it would do away 
with the subsequent exchange of arguments on that evidence. 
 For this purpose, the adoption of the following text as Article 22.3bis 
of the DSU is suggested in order to facilitate cross-retaliation by developing 
country members:  
 “Notwithstanding the provisions contained in Paragraph 3, if the 
complaining party is a developing country, such Member shall have the right 
to seek authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations in any 
sector(s) under any covered agreement(s).” 
 In light of this wording, facilitated cross-retaliation would be 
available for developing country complainants irrespective of the 
respondent’s status. It is noteworthy that this proposal would not introduce a 
new right: article 22(3) of the DSU already provided for cross-retaliation. 
The added value of article 22(3bis) would be to make article 22(3) readily 
accessible for developing countries. 
 Nonetheless, serious doubts are still express as to a possible added 
value of such a reform given that if a developing country complainant has a 
small volume of trade, it can easily demonstrate that retaliation in the same 
sector is not practicable or effective. In that regard, some large developing 
countries would have no problems retaliating under article 22(3). A majority 
of developing countries do not have, however, a sufficiently diversified 
economy to effectively retaliate in the same sector. Questions have also 
raised as to how the proposal would address asymmetry between a large 
developing country complainant and a small developed country respondent. 
In response, it is explained that large developing country members would not 
be excluded from the proposal, but they would not need it to effectively 
retaliate and are not the main target of the proposal. In view of the great 
difference between developing country members trade profiles, some 
participants have suggested that if the intention is to address the specific 
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difficulties faced by certain developing countries, article 22(3bis) should be 
limited to that group of members. At the same time, it is widely recognized 
that any reclassification of member would be politically sensitive [Ronald S. 
Soto, 2015]. 
 
The calculation of the level of nullification or impairment for developing 
country complainants  
 Under article 21(8) of the DSU, the DSB is required to take into 
account the impact of the measures at issue on the economy of the 
developing country complainant. To enhance the effectiveness of article 
21(8) of the DSU, the proponents suggest an amendment of article 22(4) of 
the DSU to take into account the economic impact of the inconsistent 
measure on the developing country complainant. The provision would read 
as follows:  
 “The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations, 
authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or 
impairment. If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, the 
level of nullification and impairment shall also include an estimate of the 
impact of the inconsistent measure on the economy of such Member.”  
 The proposal’s rationale has received large support from participants 
arguing that article 21(8) of the DSU has to be made effective in practice. At 
the same time, there is considerable skepticism on how it could be 
implemented in its current form.  
  
Conclusion 
 The above discussion suggests, at least, three main observations: 
 Firstly, a large consensus emerges amongst the participants on the 
fact that improvements and clarifications to the DSU can meaningfully 
promote both the integration of the developing countries in the world trading 
system and the strengthening of the entire multilateral trading system. 
Developing country interests are thus perceived as of major importance for 
the completion of multilateral negotiations in this field. In this respect, it is 
undisputed that measurable progress has been made towards draft legal text 
in a number of areas. Current discussions are occurring in a constructive 
spirit, and based on a combination of meetings of variable geometry 
depending on the issue being discussed. On the ground, key points of 
convergence are identified, even if the level of convergence on various issues 
still varies significantly. 
 Secondly, while expressing sympathy for developing country 
concerns, some participants continue to express reservations with the current 
proposals, including on a conceptual level.  These members acknowledge the 
need to support developing countries but this must be done fairly and 
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neutrally. If the broad objective is to ensure that the WTO dispute settlement 
system is user-friendly and accessible to all members, it would be more 
useful, they argue, not to present issues in negotiations in terms exclusively 
of developing country versus developed country distinctions. Discussions 
would be more fruitful if proposals were viewed more horizontally, and were 
not limited to exclusively benefit developing countries. They recall that 
small economy developed country members consider that they face similar 
asymmetries, and may also wish to benefit from concepts embodied in these 
proposals. In sum, any proposal in this field should be generalized rather 
than presented as special and differential treatment, exclusively in favor of a 
category of members.   
 Last but not least, if the proposed reforms constitute a step forward 
towards a better efficiency and legitimacy of the Dispute Settlement System, 
other avenues would deserve further assessment. The drawbacks of 
developing country member economies and their lack of diversification 
require, in parallel, a special emphasis on promoting opportunities of 
monetary compensation as a possibly more effective means of achieving 
satisfaction for affected sectors than retaliation. In this respect, it is striking 
to note that participants do not find many cases where retaliation was 
partially helping compliance or rebalancing concessions. In the same sense, 
making mediation mandatory in disputes involving developing or least-
developed countries and, more generally, enhancing DSU consultation and 
mediation processes may have merit. A differentiation amongst developing 
country members is also inevitable. A distinction between emerging 
countries and other developing countries would permit to focus more 
efficiently on the needs and specifics of truly vulnerable members.   
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